CALEB LOH dives into three misconceptions about the ethnically Han Chinese community living in Singapore and its myriad political implications.

Singapore’s Chinese community is miniscule on a global scale: fewer Han Chinese live in Singapore than in neighboring Indonesia, Malaysia, or Thailand, not to mention China or Taiwan. Yet, Singapore and its Chinese community inhabit a unique position. Of the 193 United Nations member states, only China and Singapore have a Han-majority population; a former Singaporean top diplomat once convolutedly described Singapore as the “only sovereign democratic Chinese-majority country in the world”, much to his audience’s bemusement. Many observers hence see Singapore as part of both the cosmopolitan West and of a Greater China, with the international press increasingly consulting Singaporean politicians, diplomats, and intellectuals about their views on US-China relations in a bid to “understand China”. A Chinese saying may suggest that “onlookers see the world more clearly”, but if international observers want to properly contextualize Singaporeans’ views about China, I would argue that the onlooker also requires understanding on their own terms. This article thus seeks to reassess three common misconceptions about Singapore’s Chinese community to contribute to a more complete picture of a country that may well become a focal point amidst greater US-China contestation.

The first misconception is that Singaporean Chinese share similar cultural traits and political values to their Han counterparts in China. Many commentators equate ethnic affinity with sociopolitical allegiance: earlier this year, during a US Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Senator Tom Cotton asked TikTok CEO Chew Shou Zi, a Singapore national, if he was a member of the Chinese Community Party (CCP). Singaporean circles mocked this line of questioning as the notion that the CCP had a foothold was universally considered ludicrous given Singapore’s tight controls on foreign political expression. Most Singaporean Chinese are not recent immigrants, but were born in Singapore, have not lived in China, and are distant from generational memories of emigration. Having grown up in a stable, apolitical environment, most Singaporeans do not have an active interest in Chinese affairs: knowledge about domestic Chinese politics tends to be superficial, in part because Western platforms like Facebook and Instagram are more widespread sources of information than Baidu or Weibo. Moreover, most Singaporean Chinese trace their origins to the southern provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, far from the historical centers of economic or political power. China and Singapore hence differ, to use an expression Napoleon coined for the relationship between France and his native Corsica, “as the moonlight differs from the sunshine”. Therefore, to assume that Singaporean Chinese can provide special insight into understanding Chinese politics or “the Chinese character” overall is fallacious.

The second misconception is that Singaporean Chinese identity is monolithic and static. Because of its small population size, observers presume some internal unity to Singapore’s Chinese community. Yet, Singaporean Chinese identity is best described as a palimpsest, reflecting constant social evolutions and dualities. The earliest Chinese immigrants to Singapore had lived for centuries in the Malayan peninsula, usually had some native Malay ancestry, and were described as the “Queen’s Chinese” for their wealth and their acquiescence to colonial authority. Later immigrants were largely working-class, spoke Southern Chinese languages like Hokkien, Teochew, and Cantonese, and never intended to remain in Singapore for the long term; yet others arrived from China following the 1911 and 1949 revolutions. Immigration from China has ebbed at times but has never fully ceased, with continual waves of post-independence migration enabled by open immigration policies. This history has meant that no universal consensus exists regarding what it means to be “Singaporean Chinese”. Some people might suggest that Mandarin unifies the Chinese community—yet both ethnic Chinese candidates in Singapore’s most recent presidential election could not speak fluent Mandarin, having grown up in colonial times and carrying the legacy of the “Queen’s Chinese” into the 21st century. Perhaps then, what unifies Singapore’s Chinese community is a common set of values or social norms—except that founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, as did many other Singaporeans, grew up in Westernized environments. The Singaporean Chinese identity is diverse, reflected in the lack of overwhelming consensus on US-China issues: polls indicate that 60 percent of Singaporeans broadly support the US while 40 percent favor China.

The third misconception is that Singapore’s Chineseness is an important component of its national identity. Many foreign ethnic Chinese commentators see Singapore as proof that Confucian social values can be reconciled with Western institutions. Others see Singapore as a “city on the hill”, providing refuge in a region where the Chinese have been historically discriminated, serving as a metaphorical Israel for the “Jews of Southeast Asia”. Those who hope or expect Singapore to be a preserve for Chinese culture fail to recognize the priorities of the Chinese community and neglect Singapore’s strong cosmopolitan character. In the 2023 presidential election, an ethnically Indian candidate won against two ethnic Chinese challengers with 70 percent of the vote in a free election, a feat that required a plurality of support from the Chinese community. Singapore does not see itself as part of a Greater China: Singapore contains a mansion once owned by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen and where the first flag of the Republic of China was allegedly sewn, yet this monument is presented as a piece of trivia rather than given a prominent place in nation-building narratives. Singaporean Chinese generally acquiesced when Southern Chinese languages were banned in public broadcasts during the 1980s and are inert today towards the prospect of declining Mandarin proficiency. Though declining Mandarin usage is possibly the most major concern for the Chinese grassroots—at least quantified based on column space in Chinese-language papers—there is no movement militating for the reintroduction of Chinese-medium schools or for Mandarin to be made Singapore’s lingua franca, simply because this is too far from the mainstream for a community socialized into multiracial norms. Many social institutions are heading in the opposite direction. The Workers’ Party—Singapore’s main opposition party, accused in the 1990s for harboring “Chinese chauvinists”—supports a mandatory English test for immigrants, from China and elsewhere, as part of its policy platform.

The Chinese community in Singapore has been and will continually be understood through many colored prisms, sometimes to serve personal political agendas, and sometimes due to misguided beliefs rather than malicious intentions. At the same time, Singaporeans will continue to stand at the confluence of seemingly oppositional political, ethnic, and social influences: many Singaporeans like myself are personally proud of their Chinese heritage and feel invested in Chinese culture, yet feel an equally deep commitment to their nation and are even prouder that Singapore has been able to join the league of developed countries which have elected minority candidates to its highest offices. I hope that the reader will embrace these contradictions and consider how presentations of Singapore’s Chinese community align not just with ideological narratives, but also with complex yet undeniable social realities.

Caleb Loh is a freshman at Yale University and is a prospective Ethics, Politics, and Economics major. Having grown up in Singapore, he is interested in the intersections between Chinese politics, identity, culture, and society in Southeast Asia and other diaspora communities. His other academic interests include history, literature, psychology, and philosophy. He is also a member of the Yale Debate Association and a Fellow with the Peace and Dialogue Leadership Initiative, which seeks to foster better conversations about Israel-Palestine relations. He can be reached at caleb.loh@yale.edu to chat about anything under the sun.